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Abstract: Any simple perturbation in a part of the game whether in the cost function and/or conditions
is a big problem because it will require a game re-solution to obtain the perturbed optimal solution. This is
a waste of time because there are methods required several steps to obtain the optimal solution, then at the
end we may find that there is no solution. Therefore, it was necessary to find a method to ensure that the
game optimal solution exists in the case of a change in the game data. This is the aim of this paper. We
first provided a continuous static game rough treatment with Min-Max solutions, then a parametric study for
the processing game and called a parametric rough continuous static game (PRCSG). In a Parametric study, a
solution approach is provided based on the parameter existence in the cost function that reflects the perturbation
that may occur to it to determine the parameter range in which the optimal solution point keeps in the surely
region that is called the stability set of the 1st kind. Also the sets of possible upper and lower stability to which
the optimal solution belongs are characterized. Finally, numerical examples are given to clarify the solution
algorithm.
Keywords: Continuous static game, Rough programming, Non-linear programming, Rough set theory,
Parametric linear programming, Parametric non-linear programming.
1. Introduction
Rough programming is introduced in [7, 8, 13, 19]. It is classified into three classes based on the
roughness detected [13]; 1st class: the roughness exists in a feasible set with crisp objective function;
2nd class: the roughness exists in the objective function with a crisp feasible set; 3rd class: the
roughness exists in both feasible set and objective function. Therefore, the nonlinear programming
problem [2, 3, 11] with a rough representation is called a rough nonlinear programming problem
(RNPP) and can be defined by roughness, which may be in constraints and/or objective functions.
The RNPP has two solution sets: possibly and surely feasible optimal solution sets in the 1st class.
Parametric optimization [6] is a helpful universal tool that has recently got many applications in
process engineering systems [1, 7, 14, 20]. Given a constrained optimization problem, including a
set of variables and bounded parameters, it provides the optimal value of the variables as an explicit
function of the parameters without completely enumerating the entire space of the parameters. This
means that if the value of the parameter changes within the given bounds, the optimal solution can
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be obtained by a simple evaluation of the explicit function without having to resolve an optimization
problem. This is a powerful result that has been successfully applied in multiobjective optimization
[10, 15], stochastic optimization [4, 16], flexibility analysis, hybrid, and robust model-based control
[5, 17]. This paper investigates the analysis of basic concepts in a parametric rough continuous
static game when parameters are in the cost functions and roughness is in the constraints which are
not discussed before. A survey of rough optimality, rough set theory (RST), and rough functions
is necessary for parametric studying of RNPP.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces Min-Max solutions for the rough
continuous static game of 1st class with an illustrative example to explain the solution steps.
In Section 3, the Rough Continuous Static game parametric study when roughness exists in the
constraints and parameters in the objective functions is discussed with a numerical example to
clear up the presented concepts. Section 4 covers the conclusion and future studies.
2. 1st class of Rough Continuous Static game (RCSG)
The continuous static game (CSG) [9, 17, 18] is defined as an optimization problem where each
player in the game controls a specified subset of the system parameters and seeks to minimize his
own cost criterion subject to specified constraints. In these games control notation is used and each
player i = 1, . . . , r selects his control vector ui ∈ Es seeking to minimize a scalar valued criterion
Gi(x, u), (2.1)
subject to n equality constrains
g(x, u) = 0, (2.2)
where x ∈ Es is the state and
u = (u1, . . . , ur) ∈ Es, s = s1 + . . .+ sr
is the composite control. The composite control is required to be an element of a regular control
constraint set Ω ⊆ Es of the form:
Ω = {u ∈ Es|h(x, u) ≥ 0},
where x = ζ(u) is the solution of (2.2) given u. The functions
Gi(x, u) : E
n ∗ Es → E1, g(x, u) : En ∗Es → En, h(x, u) : En → Es → Eq










in a ball around a solution point (x, u). The above problem can be written as:
minGi(x, u),
S.T.
M = {x ∈ En, u ∈ Es| g(x, u) = 0, h(x, u) ≥ 0},
where Gi is called the cost function for each player i = 1, . . . , r, and M is called the feasible set of
the problem.
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Definition 1. Let A(U,R) be an approximation space, U be the universe and R be an equiv-




M∗ ⊆ M ⊆ M
∗,
where M∗,M
∗ are lower and upper approximation of the feasible set, respectively. The solution sets
of the 1st class of RCSG are called a surely optimal solution set and a possibly optimal solution set.




The optimal solution set of the above game is
O =
{









There are now two possibilities: one providing surely optimal solution, possibly optimal solution
and another one leads us to resolve the game on the lower approximation as follows:
• If O1 = O∩M∗ 6= ∅, then a solution set O1 is called a surely optimal solution set and O ∼ O1
is possibly optimal solution set.
• If O1 = O ∩ M∗ = ∅, then O ⊆ MBN (boundary approximation of feasible region). In
this case, the game does not have surely optimal solution set. Therefore, it will be resolved
on the lower approximation to obtain O2, which is an optimal solution set on the lower
approximation.
Where, the game on the lower approximation is
minGi(x, u), (2.3)
S.T.
M∗ ⊆ M, (2.4)




Definition 2. If O1 6= ∅, then O1 contains all surely optimal solutions, hence it is called the
surely optimal set O1 ⊆ M .
Definition 3. O ∼ O1 contains possibly optimal solutions, hence it is called the possibly opti-
mal set because O ∼ O1 ⊆ MBN .
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2.1. Min-Max solutions for the 1st class of RCSG
For this game player i chooses his control under the assumption that all players have formed
a coalition to maximize his cost. In other words, all players expect one cooperate against the
remaining player i.
Definition 4. A point w∗ = (u∗i , v∗) is a completely regular lower point if and only if w∗ is a
regular point of Ω and u∗i is a regular point of U∗i for each i = 1, . . . , r. Here u∗i is a lower control
vector for each player i = 1, . . . , r and v∗ is the composite lower control of the remaining players,




s| h∗[ζ(u∗i , v∗), u∗i , v∗] ≥ 0
}
. (2.5)
Definition 5. A point ũ∗ ∈ Ω is a rough min-max lower point for player i if and only if
Gi[ζ(ũ∗i , v∗), ũ∗i , v∗] ≤ Gi[ζ(ũ∗), ũ∗] ≤ Gi[ζ(u∗i , ṽ∗), u∗i , ṽ∗]
for all u∗i ∈ U∗i where ũ∗ = (ũ∗i , ṽ∗), U∗i is defined by (2.5) and x∗ = ζ(u∗) is the solution to
M∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0. For a local rough min-max lower point replace U∗i by Bi ∩ U∗ for some ball
Bi ⊂ E
s centered at ũ∗.
Lemma 1. If ũ∗ = (ui∗ , v∗) ∈ Ω is a local min-max lower point for player i for the game (2.3)–
(2.4), and if x∗ = ζ(u∗) is the solution to M∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0, then there exists a vector γ∗i ∈ E
n defined
by
∂J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ]
∂x∗
= 0,
∂J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ]
∂u∗i
ei = 0,
for all ei ∈ T∗i and
∂J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ]
∂v∗
ev = 0,
for all ev ∈ T∗v , where
J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ] = G∗i(x∗, u∗)− γ∗i
T g∗(x∗, u∗), (2.6)









































where h∗ denotes the active inequality constraints at u∗ = (u∗i , v∗).
Proposition 1. If ũ∗ = (u∗, v∗) ∈ Ω is a completely regular rough min-max lower point for
the player i and x∗ = ζ(ũ∗) is the solution to M∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0, then there exist vectors λ∗i ∈ E
n,
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λ̄∗i ∈ E
n, µ∗i ∈ E
q and µ̄∗i ∈ E
q such that :
∂L∗i [x∗, ũ∗, λ∗i , µ∗i ]
∂x∗
= 0, (2.7)
∂L∗i [x∗, ũ∗, λ̄∗i , µ̄∗i ]
∂x∗
= 0, (2.8)
∂L∗i [x∗, ũ∗, λ∗i , µ∗i ]
∂u∗
= 0, (2.9)
∂L∗i [x∗, ũ∗, λ̄∗i , µ̄∗i ]
∂v∗
= 0, (2.10)
M∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0,
µT
∗i
h∗(x̃, ũ∗) = 0, (2.11)
µ̄T
∗i
h∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0, (2.12)
h∗(x̃, ũ∗) ≥ 0,
µ∗i ≥ 0, (2.13)
µ̄∗i ≤ 0, (2.14)
where
L∗i [x∗, ũ∗, λ∗i , µ∗i ] = Gi(x∗, u∗)− λ∗iM∗(x∗, u∗i)− µ∗ih∗(x∗, u∗i), (2.15)
L∗i [x∗, ũ∗, λ̄∗i , µ̄∗i ] = Gi(x∗, u∗)− λ̄∗iM∗(x∗, u∗i)− µ̄∗ih∗(x∗, u∗i).












































Th∗ = 0, µ∗2 ≥ 0
}
,












TZ∗2 ≥ 0 ∀y∗2 ∈ K∗2
}
.








From this result and Lemma 1 we have
∂J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ]
∂u∗i
∈ K∗i , (2.16)
∂J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ]
∂v∗
∈ K∗2 , (2.17)
where J∗i is defined by (2.6) and γ∗i is defined by
∂J∗i [x∗, ũ∗, γ∗i ]
∂x∗
= 0. (2.18)

























with L∗i defined by (2.15) and choosing µ∗i − µ̃∗i = 0, equation (2.7) follows from (2.18) by
substituting for γ∗i from (2.19). Similarly (2.9), (2.11) and (2.13) follow from (2.16), (2.19) and
the definition of k∗i . Choosing µ̃∗i = −µ̃∗2 ≤ 0 and substituting for γ∗i from (2.20) we see that the
equation (2.8) follows from (2.18). Similarly (2.10), (2.12) and (2.14) follow from (2.17) and from
the definition of k∗2 . 
Definition 6. A point w∗ = (u∗i , v
∗) is a completely regular upper point if and only if w∗ is a
regular point of Ω and u∗i is a regular point of U
∗
i for each i = 1, . . . , r. Here u
∗
i is a lower control
vector for each player i = 1, . . . , r and v∗ is the composite lower control of the remaining players,




s| h∗[ζ(u∗i , v








∗), ũ∗i , v
∗] ≤ Gi[ζ(ũ
∗), ũ∗] ≤ Gi[ζ(u∗i , ṽ∗), u∗i , ṽ∗]
For all u∗i ∈ U
∗
i where ũ
∗ = (ũ∗i , ṽ
∗), U∗i is defined by (2.21) and x
∗ = ζ(u∗) is the solution to
M∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0. For a local rough min-max lower point replace U∗i by Bi ∩ U
∗ for some ball
Bi ⊂ E
s centered at ũ∗.
Proposition 2. If ũ∗ = (u∗, v∗) ∈ Ω is a completely regular rough min-max upper point for
the player i and x∗ = ζ(ũ∗) is the solution to M∗(x∗, ũ∗) = 0, then there exist vectors λ∗i ∈ E
n,
λ̄∗i ∈ E
n , µ∗i ∈ E
q and a vector µ̄∗i ∈ E
q such that :
∂L∗i [x


































∗, ũ∗, λ∗i , µ
∗
i ] = Gi(x
∗, u∗, v∗)− λ∗iM
∗(x∗, u∗, v∗)− µ∗ih
∗(x∗, u∗, v∗),
L∗i [x
∗, ũ∗, λ∗i , µ
∗
i ] = Gi(x
∗, u∗, v∗)− λ̄∗iM
∗(x∗, u∗, v∗)− µ̄∗ih
∗(x∗, u∗, v∗).
P r o o f is similar to proof of Proposion 1. 
The numerical example below will explain how we can find the min-max optimal solution point
for the 1st class RCSG.
Example 1. Two firms sell substitutable products and seek to maximize their profits through
advertising. The steady-state profits of firms 1 and 2 are taken respectively, as
H1(·) = 5x− u− v,
H2(·) = 3x− v − 2u.
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The equilibrium (steady-state) fraction of the market x that firms receive is given by
−7x+ u− 4xv = 0 ⊆ M(·) ⊆ −2x+ v − 2xu = 0, (2.22)
where u and v are control vectors of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively.
Solution 1. Two firms seek to maximize H1(·) and H2(·). Thus, firms seek to minimize
G1(·) = −5x+ u+ v, (2.23)
G2(·) = −3x+ v + 2u. (2.24)
Let us solve the problem (upper approximation) using Min-Max concept:





M∗ = −2x∗ + v∗ − 2x∗u∗ = 0.
Here we have
L∗1 = G1(·)− λ
∗
1M
∗ = −5x∗ + u∗ + v∗ − λ∗1(−2x
∗ + v∗ − 2x∗u∗),
∂L∗1
∂x∗
= −5− λ∗1(−2− 2u













= 1− λ∗1 = 0 ⇒ λ
∗








Since M∗ = 0 ⇒ V ∗ = −5/2. So, Rough Min-Max upper point is ũ∗ = (3/2,−5/2) and the optimal
solution value of the cost function on upper approximation is G∗1 = 1.5.
By testing this point, we see that the lower approximation is satisfied. So the solution we
have got is a surely optimal solution for player 1 and there is no need for a solution at the lower
approximation.





M∗ = −2x∗ + v∗ − 2x∗u∗ = 0.
Here we have
L∗2 = G2(·) − λ
∗
2M
∗ = −3x∗ + v∗ + 2u∗ − λ∗2(−2x
∗ + v∗ − 2x∗u∗),
∂L∗2
∂x∗
= −3− λ∗2(−2− 2u













= 1− λ∗2 = 0 ⇒ λ
∗




, x∗ = −1.
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Since M∗ = 0 ⇒ V ∗ = −3. So, Rough Min-Max upper point is ũ∗ = (1/2,−3) and the optimal
solution value of the cost function on upper approximation is G∗2 = 1. By testing this point, the
lower approximation is not achieved. So the game for player 2 does not have a surely optimal
solution and it will be resolved at the lower approximation.
Let us continue consideration (lower approximation).





M∗ = −7x∗ + u∗ − 4x∗v∗ = 0.
Here we have
L2∗ = G2(·)− λ2∗M∗ = −3x∗ + v∗ + 2u∗ − λ2∗(−7x∗ + u∗ − 4x∗v∗),
∂L2∗
∂x∗













= 2− λ2∗ = 0 ⇒ λ2∗ = 2 ⇒ v∗ = −
11
8




Since M∗ = 0 ⇒ u∗ = −3/16. So, Rough Min-Max lower point is ũ∗ = (−3/16,−11/8) and the
optimal solution value of the cost function on lower approximation is G2∗ = −1.375.
3. Parametric Rough Continuous Static game
A parametric study of a Rough Continuous Static game often provides a new insight into the
Rough Continuous Static game. The parameter existence in Parametric Rough Continuous Static
game (PRCSG) results in two cases, the first one: roughness is in the constraints and the parameter
is in the cost function and the second case: the parameter is in the constraints and roughness is in
the cost function. In this paper, the first case is what our study is about and the basic concepts of
the parametric convex programming which are used here are established in Osman papers [5, 12]
i.e. the solvability set, the stability set of the first kind.
3.1. The 1st case of Parametric Rough Continuous Static game (PRCSG)
Here we consider the case when the parameters are in the cost function and roughness is in the
constraints. It can be defined as:
minGi(ui, Pi), (3.1)
S.T.
m ∈ M, (3.2)
where Gi is a cost function for each player i = 1, . . . , r and M is the feasible region of the game
which is a rough convex set defined by M∗ ⊆ M ⊆ M
∗, and Pi are real parameters, i = 1, . . . , r.
Definition 8. The solvability set of the game (3.1), (3.2) denoted by S is defined by two sets
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for any Pi ∈ S. If m̄ is a surely optimal solution then the stability of the 1
st kind can be defined
and obtained.









Then the stability set of the 1st kind for the game (3.1), (3.2) corresponding to m̄ denoted
by S1(m̄) is defined by
S1(m̄) =
{




for any Pi ∈ S. If m̄ is a possible optimal solution then the stability of the 3
rd kind can be defined
and obtained.









Then the possibly lower stability set for the game (3.1), (3.2) corresponding to m̄∗ denoted
by S2∗(m̄∗) is defined by
S2∗(m̄∗) =
{










m̄∗ ∈ M∗| Gi(m̄





Then the possibly upper stability set for the game (3.1), (3.2) corresponding to m̄∗ denoted
by S∗2(m̄




Pi ∈ S| Gi(m̄






The steps below lead us to obtain the stability set of the 1st kind, the possibly upper and lower
stability sets when the parameters are found in cost function and roughness is in the constraints:
1. Formulate the game and include all the parameters that need to be examined.
2. For player 1, begin with a certain Pi ∈ S and use Proposition 2 to get the optimal solution
at upper approximation.
3. If the point that is obtained from the previous step is a surely optimal solution point then
formulate Proposition 2 at it to find the stability set of 1st kind. Otherwise, for a possible
optimal solution point use Propositions 1 and 2 to obtain the possibly lower and upper
stability sets.
4. Repeat for each one of the remaining players.
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Example 2. Consider the game
G1(·) = u
2 + v2 + P1u− v, (3.3)
G2(·) = u
2 + v2 − 5u+ P2v, (3.4)
S.T.
(u+ v ≤ 1) ⊆ M(·) ⊆ (u2 + v2 ≤ 9, u+ v ≤ 5). (3.5)
Solution 2 (Upper approximation). Using Min-Max concept we find the following results.





















− 9) + µ∗2(u
∗ + v∗ − 5) = 0,
∂L∗1
∂u∗













− 9) = 0, µ∗2(u
∗ + v∗ − 5) = 0.
When µ∗1 > 0 and µ
∗
2 = 0, we conclude















− 9 = 0. Then, µ∗1 = 0.178511 ⇒ (u
∗, V ∗) = (2.9698, 0.42445).
When µ∗2 > 0 and µ
∗
1 = 0, we conclude










Since µ∗2 > 0 ⇒ u
∗ + v∗ − 5 = 0. Then, µ∗2 = −1. This solution is refused.
So, the upper optimal solution point (u∗, v∗) = (2.9698, 0.42445) is a surely optimal solution
point then the stability of the 1st kind will be obtained as follows:
2(2.9698) + P1 + 2(2.9698)µ
∗






Since µ∗1 > 0 ⇒ −5.94225 − P1 > 0 ⇒ P1 < −5.94225.
So the stability of the 1st kind is:
(P1 < −5.94225).
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− 9) + µ∗2(u
∗ + v∗ − 5) = 0,
∂L∗1
∂u∗













− 9) = 0, µ∗2(u
∗ + v∗ − 5) = 0.
When µ∗1 > 0 and µ
∗
2 = 0, we have















− 9 = 0. Then, µ∗1 = 0.06718 ⇒ (u
∗, V ∗) = (2.3426, 1.874).
When µ∗2 > 0 and µ
∗
1 = 0, we have










Since µ∗2 > 0 ⇒ u
∗ + v∗ − 5 = 0. Then, µ∗2 = −12. This solution is refused.
So, the upper optimal solution point (u∗, V ∗) = (2.3426, 1.874) is a surely optimal solution
point then the stability of the 1st kind will be obtained as follows:
2(1.874) + P2 + 2(1.874)µ
∗






Since µ∗1 > 0 ⇒ −3.748 − P2 > 0 ⇒ P2 < −3.748.
So the stability of the 1st kind corresponds to the case
(P2 < −3.748).
4. Conclusion
This paper presented a parametric study of the rough continuous static game when parameters
exist in the crisp cost function and constraints are rough sets. Furthermore, the paper provided
new concepts including the solvability set and the stability set of the 1st kind and the possibly
stability set in a rough environment. Also, the surely and possibly optimal solution sets of RCSG
in the 1st class are introduced. Future work may focus on the parametric study of the PRCSG
when parameters are found in the constraints and the cost function is a rough function.
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